A comparative assessment of labor market nationalization policies in the GCC by Hertog, Steffen
  
Steffen Hertog 
A comparative assessment of labor market 
nationalization policies in the GCC 
 
Book section 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Hertog, Steffen (2012) A comparative assessment of labor market nationalization policies in the 
GCC. In: Hertog, Steffen, (ed.) National employment, migration and education in the GCC. The 
Gulf Region: economic development and diversification,4 . Gerlach Press, Berlin, Germany. 
ISBN 9783940924001 
 
© 2012 Gerlach Press 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/46746/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: November 2012 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s submitted version of the book section. There may be differences 
between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the publisher’s 
version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
A comparative assessment of  
labor market nationalization policies in the GCC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Steffen Hertog, Sciences Po/LSE 
 
 
1 Introduction and executive summary  
For many years, GCC countries have been struggling to substitute national workers for 
foreigners on their domestic labour markets, with decidedly mixed results. The Gulf 
labour market has become the achilles heel of what in general has been a successful oil-
driven development model. Despite rapid economic growth and diversification into a 
number of new sectors, the GCC faces significant national underemployment. In the face 
of considerable demographic momentum, increasing the participation of nationals on the 
private labour market will be the crucial socio-economic challenge for GCC regimes over 
the coming years and decades.  
 
The objective of the present paper is to identify core obstacles to labour market 
nationalization in the Gulf. Saudi Arabia, the most important GCC country, will be the 
main case study, but its experience will be systematically compared with the labour 
market situation in the other GCC countries. Against this background, existing attempts 
to remedy the labour market situation will be analyzed and evaluated. 
 
Through large-scale imports of cheap labour since the 1970s and especially the 1980s, 
large parts of Saudi and GCC business have been locked into a low-productivity pattern 
of growth: substituting cheap foreign labour for process and technology upgrades that 
would make employment for more expensive and better-trained national employees 
feasible. GCC labour productivity has fallen in the 1980s and stagnated since the 1990s. 
 
Saudi Arabia is arguably the Gulf country facing the most formidable labour market 
challenge: Almost two million young Saudis are currently between 15 and 19 years of 
age, implying that about 400,000 Saudis are reaching working age every year. While the 
public sector has reached the limits of its absorptive capacity, just slightly more than 
800,000 Saudis are currently formally employed in the private market. Policies of 
Saudization since 2004 have achieved some degree of success, but these fall far short 
of the magnitude of job creation required to accommodate the kingdom’s future job 
seekers. 
 
So far, labour market nationalization in Saudi Arabia and the GCC has mostly happened 
“by fiat”, through quotas and prohibitions. This has led to rule avoidance and illegal 
practices rather than genuine national employment. The paper will show that the current 
segmentation of the Gulf labour market makes large-scale job creation for nationals 
unrealistic, as a) wage differentials between locals and expatriates are too large and b) 
higher job mobility and better labour rights for locals make them less attractive 
employees. 
 
Only Bahrain and, to a lesser extent, Oman have tried to use market-based incentives to 
make national employment more attractive. Drawing on these cases, I will argue that 
increases the price of foreign labour, together with the creation of an internally liberalized 
labour market, have produced the most convincing national employment results thus far. 
Unless labour market mechanisms in the GCC are further adjusted along these lines, 
nationalization will remain an unwinnable uphill battle. 
 
The paper’s first section will analyze the threefold segmentation of the Saudi labour 
market, while engaging with some data problems that reflect the low regulatory power of 
the institutions in charge of regulating the Saudi labour market. It then estimates 
productivity and employment rates in the kingdom, and provides a comparison of GCC 
labour market structures and developments. This is followed by an analysis of existing 
Saudization policies that is contrasted with other labour nationalization experiences in 
the GCC.  
 
 
2 The Saudi labour market  
Saudi Arabia has begun large-scale foreign labour imports in the 1970s. Whereas the 
public sector now is largely Saudiized, attempts to nationalize the private labour market, 
although official policy since at least the early 1980s, have made little headway. 
Throughout booms and busts, dependency on foreign labour has remained high. 
 
The total Saudi population in 2007 was estimated at 17.7 million individuals. Population 
growth is estimated at around 2.4% and has been trending downwards. About 10.5 
million Saudis were of working age, i.e. between 15 and 64 years, with the bulk of 
dependents (6.6 million) children between 0 and 14 years of age. Only about 600,000 
Saudis were estimated to be older than 64 years. 
 
According to SAMA and CDS, the total number of foreigners in Saudi Arabia in 2007 
was estimated at about 6.5 million. This is probably an underestimate, for several 
reasons:  
 
• Other official sources – such as the current Minister of Labour – have been 
speaking of 8 million and more foreigners. 
• CDS estimates an increase in the number of foreigners in the last four years of 
only about 150,000 per year. This seems out of line with the large increase in the 
foreign labour force as reflected by a doubling of working visas given by the 
Ministry of Labour (reportedly up to 1.7 million a year). 
• The numerical relationship of foreigners to locals according to CDS data has 
been practically constant since 1993. The only plausible explanation for this is 
that the data have been extrapolated rather than derived from survey results. 
 
Whatever the precise number of foreigners, we know that they still dominate the private 
labour market, as the large majority of them are of working age and have come to Saudi 
Arabia as labour market participants. The fact that many of them are from low-wage 
countries, and have limited working skills, is the main factor explaining the segmentation 
of Saudi labour markets and the problems the Saudi government has had with 
Saudiizing private employment. 
 
 
 
A note on aggregate labour market data 
Before discussing the basic structure of the Saudi labour market, another note on 
available data is in order. 
 
Labour market data in Saudi Arabia, as in several other Gulf states, differ significantly 
depending on the source. The CDS manpower survey for 2007 shows a total Saudi 
labour force of 4.03 million, of whom 3.58 million are recorded as employed (not broken 
down by public and private sectors). This is greatly at variance with some of the data 
emerging from the Ministry of Labour, the General Organization for Social Insurance 
(GOSI) and the Ministry of Civil Service, if the latter are combined:1  
 
• According to the Ministry of Labour (MoL), 770,000 Saudis were employed in the 
private sector in 2007. 
• GOSI, which records every private employee subject to mandatory social 
insurance, has recorded 550,000 private Saudi employees for 2007. 
• According to the Ministry of Civil Service (MoCS), a total of 760,000 Saudis were 
employed in government. 
 
The MoL and MoCS figures amount to only 1.53 million employed Saudis. It is highly 
unlikely that the difference to the CDS aggregate number can be explained away with 
self-employment and informal employment. Given that Ministry of Labour data is based 
on actual (compulsory) registration of Saudi employees in the labour and social security 
systems, it is rather likely that the CDS estimate of Saudi employment is considerably 
too large, as it is based on smaller surveys and self-reporting.  
 
This being said, the government employment figure of the Ministry of Civil Service 
probably is too small, possibly by a factor of two or more. Several forms of state 
employment – most prominently in the security and religious sectors – go largely 
unrecorded by the Ministry. A recent independent report has given a figure for actual 
Saudi government employment of 1.8 million individuals. The Ministry of Interior alone is 
reported to employ up to 500,000 individuals.2 
 
Estimates of the number of foreign employees also differ depending on the source, but 
different from Saudi employees, the orders of magnitude do not vary. The Ministry of 
Labour estimate non-Saudi employees in the private sector at 5.06 million in 2007. The 
CDS estimate of total foreign labour (calculated as the difference between total labour 
and Saudi labour) is 4.18 million. According to the Ministry of Civil Service, 69,000 
foreigners worked in the government in 2008. 
 
Whatever data we base our analysis on, it is clear that foreigners still outnumber Saudis 
on the private labour market. 
 
                                                 
1
 The 2007 SAMA annual report in fact cites some of these inconsistent numbers within the same 
chapter (pp. 224-246). 
2
 Giving a Boost, Saudi British Bank report, 7 February 2008; a news report from early 2008 
mentions 1.2. million state employees; cf. Arab News 30 January 2008. 
 
Structures of segmentation on the Saudi labour market 
Different from some of the smaller Gulf states such as the UAE and Qatar, public sector 
Saudization has by and large been achieved, although – as will be shown below – the 
price of this might have been a decline in government productivity.  
 
The Saudization of the public sector has however in many ways complicated the 
Saudiizing the private sector, as it has created a segmented labour market, to the more 
privileged section of which only nationals have access. As a result, many Saudi entrants 
to the job market still prefer public sector employment to the vagaries of the worse-
paying private sector. Segmentation means that there is no integrated labour market, 
incentives are skewed, and resources are not allocated efficiently. 
 
The public/private segmentation has several aspects: 
 
• According to data from the late 1990s, average wages on all levels of education 
are higher in the civil service. As average private sector wages for Saudis have 
declined during the last four years, and the civil service has seen several salary 
increases (first by 15%, then by three annual increments of 5%), this gap 
probably has not narrowed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Diwan/Girgis, Labor force and development in Saudi Arabia, World Bank/Ministry of 
Planning 2002 
 
 
• Fringe benefits (allowances, agency-specific social services etc.) in the civil 
service tends to be higher. 
• Working hours generally are shorter in the civil service. Private sector working 
hours can amount to 50 and more per week. 
• Job security in the civil service is very high, and salary increments tend to 
happen almost automatically. Private sector working legislation by contrast is 
rather liberal, allowing for “hire and fire” policies, although de facto the legislation 
is often interpreted in favour of Saudi employees. 
 
There is a second, as important dimension of labour market segmentation: the 
differential wages and benefits available for foreigners vs. locals. Apart from the very 
highest levels of qualification, locals tend to be more expensive to employ than 
expatriates, as they have higher wage expectations (or “reservation wages”). This is 
reflected in average private sector salary levels:  
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Civil service Private sector
Average Monthly Wage in the Private Sector 2004-2007 (SR) 
Years 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Saudi 4367 3878 3596 3624 
Non-Saudis 1037 1028 1060 1011 
Total 1385 1360 1384 1354 
Source: Ministry of Labour 
 
Saudi wages are on average more than three times as high as those of expatriates. Of 
course, the share of expatriates with very little education is higher than that of 
uneducated Saudis, so that more highly paid Saudis might also be more valuable 
workers. But even if wage statistics are broken down by type of occupation – which 
controls for education levels and productivity – Saudis in all but the very highest 
categories are paid much better than foreigners. 
 
Saudis vs. expatriate monthly wages, 2007 (SR) 
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Source: Ministry of Labour 
 
A third dimension of labour market segmentation should be mentioned briefly: that 
between Saudi men and women. Tackling this topic in depth would require a separate 
research paper, but in the context of Saudization, we should note that women seem to 
have considerably lower wage expectations in all sectors. Education cannot be the 
reason, as Saudi women on average perform better in school and university than Saudi 
men. Their lower wage demands mean that, all other things being equal, it would be 
easier to transfer foreign-held jobs to them. 
 
Saudi male vs. female monthly wages, 2007 (SR) 
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Source: Ministry of Labour 
 
Data on wage trends in recent years gives a mixed picture about the trends of labour 
market segmentation: On the one hand, average private sector wages for Saudis seem 
to have declined relative to expatriate wages, making it easier for employers to hire 
Saudis. The decline in average wages however is unlikely to indicate declining pay for 
the same type of jobs – it rather might be explained by the fact that more Saudis are 
willing to take worse-paid jobs that previously were off-limits to them, as socio-economic 
pressures to get employed have increased. This would mean that the Saudi-expatriate 
wage differential for individual jobs – at least on higher levels – has not been declining, 
and the number of Saudis in such jobs has not necessarily increased. 
 
One cause for concern is that the gap between high-level and low-level wages seems to 
have increased: Despite considerable inflation, lower-skill jobs seem to have hardly seen 
raises, as we can deduct both on the basis of anecdotal data from the kingdom and by 
combining different statistical sources: Available international surveys such as the 
annual “GulfTalent” report indicate that wages for “professionals”, i.e. highly qualified 
workers, have been increasing considerably in Saudi Arabia (albeit at lower rates than in 
most other Gulf countries). Professional wages are estimated to have risen 7.4% in 2005, 
6.5% in 2006, 7.7% in 2007, and 9.8% in 2008, making for compound growth of 35% 
over four years. The only way to explain stagnation of the overall wage averages cited 
above is with stagnation or decline of lower-level wages.  
 
Given that for the time being, only a small proportion of Saudi nationals are equipped to 
work as professionals and managers on the private labour market, this development is 
disconcerting.3 There is evidence that the Saudi leadership has been very concerned 
about the widening gap between rich and poor, the potential erosion of the Saudi middle 
class, and the widespread feeling that the current boom is bypassing a large share of 
nationals. Raising wage levels for mid-skilled jobs on the private labour market has to be 
                                                 
3
 A CDS wage survey from 2000 gives an average wage for Saudi nationals of about 5700 SR, a 
slight increase over results from a similar survey in 1996. In combination with the above MoL data, 
this indicates either another instance of incompatible statistics or a large-scale entrance of lower 
earners into the labour market after 2000, or a mixture of the two. The latter seems the most likely. 
an essential component of any strategy to stabilize the socio-economic structure of the 
kingdom.  
 
The threefold segmentation of the Saudi labour market 
The three dimensions in which the Saudi labour market is segmented is reflected in the 
skewed distribution of Saudi men, Saudi women, and foreign workers in public and 
private labour markets.  
 
Dimensions 1 and 2: Saudi/expatriate and public/private (total labour force, 2007) 
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Dimensions 2 and 3: Public/private and male/female (Saudi labour force) 
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The three dimensions of segmentation together 
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Sources: Ministry of Civil Service, Ministry of Labour 
 
We see first of all that while locals dominate the civil service, they are still outnumbered 
in the private labour market, where they are less competitive. We see secondly that this 
pattern is particularly pronounced for Saudi ladies, who have been by and large 
unsuccessful in finding private employment. Most of the rather small number of female 
Saudi workers are employed in government-run education and health institutions. This is 
paradoxical, as in fact their wage expectations and qualifications should make it easier 
for them to find private employment. The failure to employ Saudi women privately cannot 
be explained through pure market forces. The reasons rather must lie in the cultural, 
institutional and legal environment. Thirdly, we see that the ratio of Saudis in 
government employment to those in private employment is about 1:1,4 which is 
considerably higher than in both developed and developing countries, where state 
employment constitutes around 20% of the total among nationals. 
 
Several reasons for the general preference of Saudi nationals to seek public 
employment have been rehearsed above. There are also supply side factors that tend to 
make employers averse to employing Saudis: Surveys have shown that they often 
expect Saudi nationals to be less experienced and, in many fields, lacking practical 
qualifications relative to their expatriate competitors. Moreover, as we will see below, the 
current labour sponsorship system makes it easier for employers to control their foreign 
workers, hence making them more attractive employees. All these factors are also amply 
documented for the labour markets of other Gulf countries and have been shown to 
inhibit the employment of nationals there.  
 
Anecdotally, Saudi employers also frequently complain about the deficient work 
motivation of some Saudis employees. But as far as this is indeed a problem, it is 
probably an outcome of other underlying factors, such as the perceived availability of 
low-effort public sector jobs and the fact that current Saudization policy sometimes 
forces national employees on firms who would otherwise not intend to hire them. 
 
                                                 
4
 Taking MoCS figures at face value. If we believe the estimate of 1.8 million Saudis in public 
employment, the ratio is dramatically higher, with more than two out of 3 Saudis working for the 
government. 
Apart from some menial occupations, it is unlikely that there are immutable cultural 
factors that inhibit the employment of Saudis. Rather, the current labour market 
segmentation twists incentives and prices in a way that makes it less likely for Saudis to 
seek mid-level private sector jobs, and less likely for businesses to want to employ them. 
 
Labour segmentation looks different on different levels of qualification, further 
underlining the fact that it is largely driven by prices and incentives. Among Saudi 
nationals, there is a bifurcation between highly qualified individuals and the rest: The 
former are competitive on the private market, where they receive similar high salaries to 
highly qualified expatriates, as evidenced in the above statistics on wages for directors 
and managers. Most of these Saudis now seek private sector rather than public sector 
employment, as they can draw better salaries in large corporations.  
 
The relatively less qualified majority of nationals however still tends to prefer public 
sector jobs, in which salaries are higher for a given level of education (see above). 
Within that group, there is further difference between individuals with mid-level 
qualifications, many of whom could be competitive on the private labour market if the 
local-expatriate salary wedge was narrowed significantly, and Saudis with only basic 
qualification, who without skills upgrades would struggle to ever become competitive. 
This is because the salary gap for mid-level jobs like technical specialists or sales 
workers is much less dramatic than that on the level of unskilled labour (construction 
workers, agricultural workers etc.).  
 
In areas demanding unskilled labour, wages for non-Saudis can be as small as 20% of 
that of Saudis, while wages for Saudis on mid-level jobs are only between 1.5 to 2 times 
higher than those for expatriates. Taking into account that non-wage costs of foreign 
labour are significantly higher, Saudis on the middling level of the labour market should 
be the main focus on labour policy in the coming years. Working towards a narrower 
wage gap is only one of several necessary steps to overcoming labour market 
segmentation, however. 
 
Labour productivity issues 
Labour market policy tends to have two major aims. The first one is to provide full 
employment for the national population. The second one is to regulate and support 
labour markets in a way that maximizes productivity and therefore economic growth. The 
two can be at variance. Indeed, the Saudi labour and employment policies that have 
created the segmentation of public and private labour market since the 1980s seem by 
the same token to have led to a decline in productivity in both private and public sectors. 
 
Labour productivity in the non-oil sector of the Saudi economy in 2007 can be estimated 
at around 71,000 SR per worker and year.5 The same figure for 2001 is 69,800 SR, 
indicating only a marginal improvement in output per worker. If we took into account 
capital as another factor of production, then probably total factor productivity – indicating 
the efficiency at which labour is used – would have gone down, as a significant amount 
of gross fixed capital accumulation has taken place since the early 2000s. 
 
Productivity in the private sector, measured as non-oil private sector GDP divided by the 
number of private sector workers, has been even lower, as the chart below indicates. 
                                                 
5
 Based on CDS figures for total labour in the kingdom and SAMA national accounts data. The 
figures are constant 2000 SR. 
Although it might have somewhat recovered since the mid-1990s,6 it had seen a 
precipitous decline from 1982 on. The main reason for this is that the Saudi economy 
shrank significantly in this period, while the number of foreign workers continued to grow 
rapidly, reducing output per worker. Practically speaking, this entailed the large-scale 
substitution of mid-skilled Arab labour with low-skilled Asian labour, a process also 
witnessed in other GCC states. It is this substitution which has decreased private sector 
wages in many areas so much that Saudization under current market conditions is 
hardly feasible. The availability of cheap, unskilled labour has also undermined 
incentives for Saudi business to invest in technology and management structures with a 
view to enhancing productivity per labourer, creating a vicious cycle of low-margin 
production vs. low-margin workforce. 
 
Non-oil private sector productivity rates since 19747 
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Sources: CDS, SAMA 
 
The below graph illustrates that the 1980s were a decade of accelerated labour imports 
in the face of a stagnant economy. It is the structural legacy of this decade of cheap 
labour inflows which makes Saudization such a difficult problem today. 
 
                                                 
6
 It is not sure this actually is the case, as in fact CDS demographic figures likely underestimate 
the influx of foreign labour since 2004, see above. 
7
 Private sector employment is estimated by assuming that average private sector employment 
rates of the total population of foreigners and Saudis (the only demographic figures available on a 
year-to-year basis back to the 1970s) have corresponded to those witnessed in the 2000s. While 
this necessary assumption introduces some degree of imprecision, it does not change the order 
of magnitude of the estimate. 
Labour imports vs. GDP  
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Looking at growth rates instead of absolute numbers, we again see that the rate at which the 
population of foreigners increased seems to have had no relationship with GDP developments. 
OLS time series analysis does indeed show that changes in GDP growth do not explain 
changes in the growth rate growth of the expatriate population. Cheap labour imports in the 
1980s might have been used to compensate to some extent for the losses Saudi business 
witnessed in the course of the oil price crash and the collapse of government contracting 
budgets.  
 
The only statistically significant factor influencing the growth rate of the foreign population in a 
given year is the expatriate population growth rate of the previous year (p<0.01, coefficient 
0.625). This however is probably an outcome of imperfect statistics, which also casts some 
doubts on the above results: As the graph below shows, growth rates of the foreign population 
as recorded in the SAMA annual reports have been improbably stable both after the 1982 and 
the 1992 census, indicating interpolation of data rather than actual measurement. We hence 
have to treat aggregate data on foreign labour with caution. 
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 As mentioned above, it is also not quite clear how complete available statistics on 
government employment are. That being said, the figures issued by the Ministry of Civil 
Service probably reflect the overall trends in public employment fairly well. Using them in 
the denominator, we can estimate the productivity of government employment over time. 
The resulting pattern is strikingly similar to that of private sector productivity: Output per 
employee has shrunken significantly since the early 1980s and seems to have stabilized 
from the early 1990s on. Between 2001 and 2007, productivity per employee seems to 
have increased from 209,000 SR to 216,000 SR. This seems fairly high, but we need to 
keep in mind that the MoCS employment figures only include part of the total 
government payroll.  
 
Public sector employment and productivity 
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The declining productivity in both sectors is intimately tied up with the institutionalization 
of a segmented labour market in the 1980s: On the one hand, the public-private wage 
gap increased significantly through the large-scale import of cheap private sector labour. 
On the other hand, increasing numbers of Saudis were given guaranteed government 
employment, which a) undermined their incentive to seek private sector jobs and b) led 
to overstaffing in certain government agencies that reduced overall civil service 
productivity. Expatriate employment in the government reached its peak in 1992, when 
about 160,000 foreigners worked in the government, and has since declined to 69,000 in 
2007. 
 
Cheap labour imports and generous state employment might have helped to soften the 
impact of the 1980s economic crisis on Saudi businesses and citizens. They however 
also entailed a pincer movement through which both private and public productivity were 
squeezed and a labour market structure institutionalized that makes private employment 
unattractive for a large share of Saudi nationals. The situation has stabilized since the 
1990s, but it has yet to improve significantly. As will be argued, only a strategic 
immigration policy, and a labour market strategy based on prices rather than on 
administrative intervention, can re-integrate public and private labour markets, and 
sustainably increase productivity in both. 
 
Unemployment vs. underemployment 
Labour market segmentation is the main explanation for the low labour market 
participation rate in Saudi Arabia. Low participation, rather than unemployment per se, 
indicates the scale of the employment challenge and the extent to which educational 
resources and potential manpower are left idle in the kingdom. It merits a quantitative 
discussion.  
 
As mentioned above, the overall Saudi employment figure of 3.58 million from the 2007 
labour force survey probably is an overestimate. But even if we take the figure to be true, 
only 34.1% of Saudis in working age are in employment, and only 38.2% of Saudis are 
labour market participants, i.e. active on the labour market as job holders or job seekers 
(with the difference between the two figures reflecting Saudi unemployment).8 These 
ratios are far below the rates of developed countries, and significantly below those of 
most developing countries. They reflect a large-scale under-utilization of Saudi Arabia’s 
national labour potential, which is not sustainable in the long run. 
 
Part of the explanation is the uniquely low rate of female employment in the kingdom, 
which is particularly striking given the high educational achievement, willingness to work 
for lower wages and, anecdotally, better work motivation of Saudi women. Different 
figures on female employment have been produced by different agencies. According the 
CDS, 502,000 Saudi women were employed in 2007. This would make for a (very low) 
employment rate of about 10%. Summing up individual figures from MoCS and the 
Ministry of Labour, however, we arrive at an even lower employment rate: 253,000 
women were employed by the state in 2007, while 51,000 held private employment. 
Although the latter reportedly reflected an increase of more than a quarter over 2006, the 
total of 304,000 female employees still makes for an employment ratio of only 5.8%. This 
not only indicates a large waste of educational resources, but arguably also worsens 
demographic pressures in Saudi Arabia, as lower employment ratios are globally 
correlated with higher birth rates. 
 
Adding up official male employment in public and private sectors according to MoCS and 
MoL, we arrive at a total of 508,000 + 718,000 = 1,260,000 employees. This would mean 
an employment ratio of only 24% even for Saudi males, meaning that only one in four 
Saudi men of working age (15-64) actually held a job.9 
 
This seems improbably low, and much of the explanation probably lies in the fact that 
total government employment is not officially known. If we presume that the above-cited 
figure of 1.8 million government employees is true, and add this to the Ministry of 
Labour’s number of total private sector employees, we arrive at a total of 2.57 million 
Saudi employees (the exact male-female breakdown of which is not known), which 
would imply a participation ratio of 24.5% of the total Saudi population of working age. If 
we presume that all of the unaccounted public employment goes to males – which is 
reasonable, given its likely focus in the religious and security sectors – we would arrive 
at a male employment ratio of 43.1%, while the female employment ratio would remain 
at 5.8%. 
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 Based on CDS demographic data, we can calculate the total number of Saudis between 15 and 
64 years of age, generally considered working age, as 10,484,000. 
9
 Figures would be even lower if we take the number of GOSI-registered employees (546,000) as 
estimate for the national private sector labour force. 
Whatever the details, these figures mean that unemployment – officially estimated at 
11.05% for 2007, though considerably higher for females – is a lesser challenge for 
Saudi Arabia than underemployment. The graph below shows the employment ratio for 
Saudi nationals is much lower than employment ratios in any OECD country. Whereas 
we estimate that one out of four Saudis in working age has a job, three out of four 
Canadians do.  
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The low employment ratio in Saudi Arabia means that the “dependency ratio” in Saudi 
society is very high, i.e. many individuals depend on one salary. This anecdotally rings 
true, considering how many members of large families often rely on one earner in the 
kingdom. With each earner among Saudi nationals come about six dependents. 
 
While the reasonably low cost of living in Saudi Arabia might have allowed many families 
to maintain high dependency ratios, this is not sustainable indefinitely. Indeed, the higher 
participation of Saudis on low-to-mid-wage private labour markets observed above seem 
to reflect the increasing socio-economic pressure to get employment even under less 
favourable conditions. The number of jobs currently available for wages that would 
guarantee equitable socio-economic development is limited, however. While 
pauperization of larger numbers of nationals probably would eventually induce them to 
take menial, badly paid jobs, this does not appear desirable and is unlikely to be 
acceptable to the Saudi leadership. Instead, the mid-wage labour market needs to be 
boosted. Saudis cannot be forced to compete with Indians working for 100$/month – no 
Gulf citizen would be willing to wok for this wage, just like no OECD citizen would. 
 
The scope of the future employment challenge, and the danger of pauperization, 
becomes clearer if one looks at the age distribution of the Saudi population: Currently, 
almost two million young Saudis are between 15 and 19 years of age, implying that 
about 400,000 Saudis are reaching working age every year, with increasing tendency 
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 The picture for participation ratios is essentially the same, just that figures are a few percentage 
points higher for both Saudi Arabia and the comparative cases. 
over the coming years. If only half of the new cohorts are supposed to be employed, 
200,000 jobs need to be created every year.  
 
For comparison, the total 60-64 age cohort, from which many of the current generation 
of senior bureaucrats and managers of the kingdom are recruited, consists of only about 
300,000 individuals in total – some 60,000 per cohort year. If everyone in that generation 
who holds a job currently would resign at the same time, this would still not be enough to 
employ only one of the new cohort years. 
 
Age structure of Saudi Arabia (mid-2007 estimates) 
    
 
 
Source: SAMA 
 
At the same time, the presence of growing numbers of expatriates puts an increasing 
burden on the infrastructure and public services of Saudi Arabia. Taxing foreigners for 
their use seems out of the question, as many of them earn too little, and important parts 
of public services are public goods from which non-locals are difficult to exclude. The 
below graph shows that despite the recent oil boom, a large army of foreign labourers 
meets increasingly restricted fiscal resources: 
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McKinsey has estimated that expatriate workers create an average cost of 1300$ per 
year for local governments in the GCC. In the Saudi case, this implies annual costs 
between 30 and 40 billion SR, depending on how many expatriates we presume to be in 
the kingdom. 
 
Probably more important, expatriate workers continue to send significant shares of their 
income abroad, to the tune of 50-60 billion SR per year, which corresponds to about 
15% of the total private sector contribution to GDP, or the total education and human 
resources budget of the Saudi government in 2004. If this income instead accrued to 
Saudis and was locally spent or reinvested, the multiplier effects for Saudi GDP would 
probably lie considerably above the 50-60 billion alone. 
 
3 A GCC-wide comparison of labour markets and nationalization policies 
The aim of this paper is not only to analyze the mechanisms of the Saudi labour market, 
but also to benchmark the Saudi experience against that of other Gulf countries. In the 
following, therefore, an overview of labour market structures in Saudi Arabia’s GCC 
neighbours will be provided. This will be followed by an evaluation of labour market 
nationalization policies in Saudi Arabia, to be succeeded in turn by an analysis of policy 
experiences in other GCC countries. 
 
Labour market data in other GCC countries is often unreliable and can differ according 
to source. Nonetheless, orders of magnitude are clear and reproduced in the below table 
for 2005, which collates the most recent available data for the other 5 Gulf states. In 
regional comparison Saudi Arabia has a relatively large share of locals in its total labour 
force (22%). More important, locals play a comparatively large role on the private labour 
market. 
 
Table: Employed individuals in the GCC in 2005 (‘000)  
 
Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar* Saudi 
Arabia 
UAE** 
Nationals 106 319 208 64 1336 262 
% of total labour force 31% 18% 32% 8% 22% 9% 
private sector 72 43 99 9 623 70 
public sector 34 276 109 55 713 192 
Expatriates 231 1495 446 768 4809 2738 
% of total labour force 69% 82% 68% 92% 78% 91% 
private sector 227 1401 423 601 4739 2538 
public sector 3 94 23 167 70 200 
Total labour force 337 1814 654 832 6145 3000 
% of total population 47% 61% 26% 71% 27% 63% 
Sources: Gulf Investment Corporation, MoCS, MoL, SAMA, Qatar Statistics Authority, press 
survey 
 
* Data from 2007 labour force survey (the 2005 labour force survey severely underestimates the 
size of the private labour force) 
** estimates combined from different sources, no precise data available 
 
Based on the latter criterion, the GCC countries can be grouped into two categories: 
mid-income countries in whose private labour markets locals play a significant minority 
role, and high-income countries, whose private sectors are almost completely dominated 
by expatriates. Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia belong to the former group, while 
Kuwait, UAE and Qatar are members of the latter. All of them have experimented with 
labour market nationalization policies and are therefore worth comparing to Saudi Arabia. 
 
United Arab Emirates 
The UAE labour market is heavily segmented, with even higher wage differentials than in 
Saudi Arabia: Average public sector wages were higher than 30,000 $ per year already 
in the mid-1990s, and have since then seen several significant raises. In all segments of 
the private sector, the IMF estimates wages as lower than in government – including in 
the remunerative oil and financial services sectors. In agriculture and domestic services, 
wages are barely more than a tenth of what the average civil servant earns. In hotels 
and trade, individuals earn barely a quarter of the average civil servant. Clearly the 
public-private wage gap is even wider than in the kingdom, making “Emiratization” of 
private labour even more elusive. There are different estimates for the share of nationals 
in the private sector workforce, varying between 1% and 3%. 
 
Surveys have shown that the majority of UAE nationals do not want to work in the 
private sector and that nationals suffer from a lack of initiative on the private labour 
market. Although not very advanced in its nationalization policies, the UAE are a useful 
comparison case to demonstrate the same mechanisms which complicate “Saudization” 
in a more extreme and clear-cut fashion. 
 
Kuwait 
Kuwait is the one GCC country in which citizens’ entitlement to a public sector job is 
perhaps the most pronounced, not least due to an activist parliament which makes sure 
that oil income is widely distributed among nationals. Over-employment in the civil 
service is estimated at 50% and more, and 40% or more of Kuwaiti civil servants have 
not completed high school education. At the same time, wages for publicly employed 
Kuwaitis are very generous. The 36% of expatriates employed in the civil service in the 
late 1990s accounted for only 13% of the total salary bill.  
 
 
The share of Kuwaitis in the private sector has been estimated at 2.3 % for 2005. 
Although this result is very low in absolute terms, the shares of Kuwaiti men and women 
were 1.3 % and 0.9 %, respectively, indicating much better access of female nationals to 
the private labour market than in Saudi Arabia. 
 
Qatar 
Qatar is the country with the biggest per capita GDP and the smallest national 
population, meaning that its current labour nationalization policies are still oriented 
towards the public rather than the private sector. It is the only state in which expatriates 
still dominate even in the civil service. This means that the politically salient line of 
segmentation in the labour market runs between foreigners and locals, less so between 
public and private. Labour force participation rates for Qatari nationals are estimated at 
64.7% for males and 34.6% for females. While this is much higher than in Saudi Arabia, 
it is explained with the availability of free jobs for all nationals who are interested in state 
employment – a policy option that has long since ceased to be available in the Saudi 
case. 
 
Oman 
Omani labour markets are structurally much more similar to Saudi Arabia. While 
expatriates still dominate overall private employment, and nationals are reported to 
prefer public employment, the country has a significant track record in labour market 
nationalization. As in Saudi Arabia, a significant share of Omanis now rely on private 
sector incomes. In 2008, the number of privately employed Omanis11 surpassed those 
employed by the government for the first time, reaching 132,000 nationals, up from 
75,000 in 2004, reflecting a successful Omanization trend.12 At the same time, however, 
                                                 
11
 The Central Bank of Oman estimates privately employed Omanis based on registrations with 
the social insurance agency – a very conservative way of calculating private employment, 
corresponding to GOSI figures in Saudi Arabia (see above). 
12
 Other official sources estimate private Omani employment at 255,000 for 2008, based on 
compound annual growth rate of 12.7% since 2000; Khaleej Times 12 October 2008. 
expatriates increased from 407,000 to 638,000, meaning that the proportion of Omanis 
in private employment increased only slightly. Moreover, more than 80% of Omanis in 
the private sector are reported to earn less than 200 Omani Riyals, a salary that is easily 
surpassed by most public sector jobs. This means that civil service employment is still 
more attractive than most private employment; labour markets remain segmented. 
 
Rates of Omanization moreover differ strongly from one sector of the private economy to 
the other. Banking has achieved a high Omanization rate, surpassing 85% already in the 
1990s and reaching 91% by the mid- 2000s. Omanization rates are also considerable in 
transport, storage, and communication. However, neither sector is a very large employer. 
Trade, manufacturing, and hotels provide considerably more jobs but have much lower 
Omanization rates. Private education, consulting and contracting have Omanization 
rates around only 20%. Similar to Saudi Arabia, the struggling sectors are the ones who 
either pay very badly or demand highly specialized education. The high banking 
Omanization might seem to contradict the latter assertion, but in fact Omanis tend to 
perform simpler jobs in this sector: one-third of nationals in banking have a tertiary level 
of education, compared with 85 percent of the expatriates active there. 
 
Bahrain 
Bahrain is the other GCC country with a similar labour market structure to Saudi Arabia, 
and it also has a considerable track record of labour nationalization policy. The number 
of Bahrainis in the private sector increased from 55,000 to 72,000 between 2001 and 
2005, which is a considerable change compared with an almost stagnant share of 
Saudis in private employment during the same period. 78,000 Bahrainis were registered 
as privately employed in 2008, of whom 22,000 were women, a considerably higher 
proportion than in Saudi Arabia. 341,000 non-Bahrainis are active on the private labour 
market. 
 
Bahrainization successes have again been most pronounced in better-paying sectors 
such as banking and oil. However, a large segment of the private sector still remains off-
limits to nationals due to low wages: According to a recent Ernst & Young report, 70% of 
expatriates earn 99 Bahraini Dinar or less a month, while only 1% of the national 
workforce works for such low wages. Public sector salaries averaged 770 Bahraini Dinar, 
while the average private sector salary amounted to 248 BD. With public sector 
employment stagnating at less than 40,000 employees, however, increasing numbers of 
nationals are probably forced into menial jobs paying insufficient salaries, similar to what 
is happening in Oman. That being said, considering that the average private salary of 
nationals in 2008 was 527 BD (up from 372 in 2005), Bahrain seems to be the most 
advanced among all GCC countries in placing its nationals in the private sector on all 
levels of seniority – including those requiring higher education. Bahraini’s experience 
should be closely analyzed. 
 
Shared GCC labour market trends 
All GCC countries share similar problems of labour market segmentation, and they are 
also subject to common trends in productivity and wages which need to be taken into 
account in long-term labour policy planning. Just like Saudi Arabia, other GCC countries 
saw a precipitous decline in labour productivity in the 1980s, reflecting similar liberal 
labour import policies and structural shifts in the economy. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
Moreover, all GCC governments have engaged in large-scale labour imports in the 
course of the current boom – mostly to satisfy local contractors’ demands for cheap 
construction workers, but also with spillover effects into other sectors. Omani and Saudi 
attempts to stanch the inflow of workers in the mid-2000s were quickly abandoned. The 
almost full international liberalization of labour markets has allowed the perpetuation of 
very low wages in significant areas of private employment despite an economic boom. 
Cheap labour imports have also led to a further decline in labour productivity in most 
GCC markets. A study by the Conference Board has shown that output per hours 
worked across the GCC fell slightly by 0.2% between 2000 and 2007 if the oil and gas 
sector is excluded.  
 
The Gulf states seem to be collectively locked into a peculiar economic growth path that 
is built on low-skills, low-margin labour markets and thus is unsuitable for the 
nationalization of private employment. The unique situation of a national labour force 
being exposed to wide-ranging international competition – unequalled among rich 
countries in the world – will be hard to reverse completely. Yet it needs to be contained. 
 
It is encouraging that there are two exceptions to the general decline or stagnation in 
productivity: Labour productivity in Bahrain has increased by 5.1% between 2000 and 
2007, while Oman achieved 4.1% growth. While this is modest, it is significantly better 
than the results of other GCC countries. Oman and Bahrain are the only countries that 
have pursued a systematic, price- and market-based policy of labour market 
nationalization. The increase in productivity likely has to do with the entry of national 
labour on private job markets above the menial level. A partial substitution of highly and 
mid-skilled local labour for unskilled foreign labour seems the most plausible explanation 
for increased productivity – which is a sine qua non for successful employment of locals. 
The labour policies which have allowed this shift in these two cases will be subjected to 
closer scrutiny in this paper. 
 
Another encouraging fact that is common to all GCC countries is that global wage levels 
of unskilled and semi-skilled labour have gone up significantly in recent years, at least 
until the recent global slump. This has somewhat narrowed the gap between the wages 
foreigners and locals are willing to work for. Although increased wage expectations 
might create short-term problems for low-margin local businesses, they are necessary 
part and parcel of labour market reform. 
 
In India, the most important labour exporter to the Gulf globally, wages have increased 
by some 14-15% for four consecutive years until 2008, and Gulf currencies have lost 
value relative to many Asian currencies thanks to their peg to the dollar. The current 
economic crises has halted or partially reversed both developments, but if Asia reverts to 
its long-term growth trend – which is likely – this will bring along increased salary 
expectations of international workers. Not least due to the sponsorship system that ties 
workers to specific employers in the short and mid-term, wage increases of the recent 
Asian boom had not fully trickled through to Gulf labour markets. This is bound to 
happen over time, however. While most unskilled jobs will still not pay enough to sustain 
a family of nationals, a significant share of mid-skills jobs might start yielding salaries 
acceptable to nationals with secondary education. In any case, the wage chasm that 
active labour policy has to bridge will be not quite as wide as it was in recent years. 
 
Summary 
All GCC countries but Qatar are facing public sector absorption issues today, meaning 
that most employment growth for nationals has to come from the private sector in the 
long run. All of them have very high rates of civil service employment relative to the total 
national workforce, and the bureaucracy remains the preferred employer for most 
nationals apart from highly qualified individuals who can compete with expatriate 
professionals for well-paid managerial positions in business. 
 
All labour markets are segmented in at least two important dimensions: between public 
and private employment and expatriate and local employment. The main factor of 
segmentation are wages, but working conditions and expectations as well as flexibility in 
hiring and firing also play an important role in preventing integrated national labour 
markets from emerging.13 
  
The two countries that are under the strongest pressure to nationalize private sector 
labour markets are Bahrain and Oman. Their labour market structures and the available 
resources per citizen are also the most similar to the Saudi one. They are relatively more 
advanced in their nationalization and “de-segmentation” policies, however. As in Saudi 
Arabia, some of the nationalization has happened in the low-wage sector, but overall 
rates and levels of nationalization are more advanced all across the board. 
 
The overview of GCC labour markets shows that all suffer from broadly similar long-term 
problems. The challenges are deep and structural in nature and hence can only be 
influenced by policies that change the basic market mechanisms underpinning 
employment in the Gulf – which puts a question mark over the utility of some of the 
short-term administrative measures of labour market nationalization the region has seen 
in the last decade.  
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 Kuwait is the one country that seems to have overcome gender segmentation of the labour 
market to a significant degree. Other countries have been less successful at this, but nowhere is 
the problem as pronounced as in the Saudi case. 
4 Saudi Arabian labour and Saudization policy 
Against the above background of structural labour market forces, the following section 
will analyze existing labour market nationalization policies in the Saudi kingdom, 
explaining both their successes and failures.  
 
Saudi Arabian labour legislation is fairly liberal, but often interpreted in a rather labour-
friendly way, especially when Saudi employees are concerned – to the extent that labour 
courts force companies to re-employ individuals who feel that they have been wrongly 
dismissed. Expatriate employees can in general be fired rather easily, and working hour 
rules are flexible, earning Saudi Arabia high scores for Labor Freedom (80.6%) on the 
Heritage Foundation’s Economic Freedom Index. With regards to the employment of 
expatriates, the new labour law of 2005 has included only rather minor changes to the 
existing legislation, leaving basic rules on sponsorship and restricted internal mobility for 
expatriate labour intact. 
 
The system of sponsorship constitutes the main legal difference between Saudi and 
foreign employees, and usually puts foreigners in a position of relative dependence on 
their sponsor. They can leave for a new employer only if their current one writes them a 
“no objection letter”, meaning that they usually are not internally mobile on the Saudi 
labour market and hence have a disadvantaged bargaining position vis-à-vis their 
employers, who in many cases also keep the passports of their expatriate workers. 
Sponsorship makes it hard for foreigners to effectively negotiate wages and working 
conditions, which in turn makes them attractive as relatively cheaper and more compliant 
employees. Saudis by contrast can leave their employers any time and hence have a 
much stronger bargaining position, which makes many employers reluctant to take them 
on. Many businessmen complain about the high turnover of local employees, making it 
unprofitable to recruit them even if issues such as higher salary expectations and lesser 
experience are discounted. Apart from wages, the sponsorship system is the main 
reason segmenting labour markets between foreigners and locals, undermining the 
competitiveness of nationals on the private labour market. 
 
Saudization reforms 
 “Saudization” policies thus far have mostly been based on administrative intervention 
rather than on changing the prices and regulatory mechanisms that create segmented 
markets. Saudization by decree has had some degree of success, but has brought along 
significant costs and inefficiencies that a market-oriented policy could have minimized. 
 
Saudization has been under way since the mid-1990s in earnest, and has been given a 
further boost by the consolidation of labour policy jurisdiction under the Ministry of 
Labour in 2004, which put an end to the issuing of work visas by numerous different 
government agencies – a crucial prerequisite for a nationally integrated labour policy. 
 
The main instruments of Saudization have been:  
 
• National employment quotas of both sectoral and global nature. Decree 50 of 
1995 stipulated an annual 5% increase in the employment share of Saudis in all 
companies with more than 20 employees. As the quotas turned out to be 
unimplementable in most sectors, however, the decree has been interpreted in 
many different ways, and in recent years the Ministry of Labour has taken to 
imposing different quotas on different sectors (allowing for lower Saudization in 
the low-wage contracting sector e.g.). Even those quotas however have often 
been honored in the breach, and in fact employment of Saudis is often 
negotiated on a discretionary basis between companies and labour offices. The 
new labour law restated a previously existing, global 75% Saudization quota, but 
without outlining an implementation mechanism. The first Saudization quotas 
were in fact codified as early as the late 1940s, but never consistently 
implemented. 
• The reservation of specific job categories for Saudis. An increasing number of 
jobs – often of security, administrative/clerical and sales nature – have been 
reserved for Saudis. Visas are not given for these occupations anymore, but 
employers have found ways to move around these restrictions. 
• The subsidization of training and initial employment for Saudi workers through 
the Human Resources Development Fund (HRDF). HRDF supports both on-the-
job training and the initial phase of employment through subsidizing wages, with 
a view to making Saudi employees affordable to employers while guaranteeing a 
livable income to Saudis. While this appears a viable method of temporarily 
tackling the foreigner-Saudi wage gap, it is not clear whether Saudis will remain 
competitive employees after wage subsidies are phased out. Recent reports 
have shown that some 75% of HRDF beneficiaries do not stay on the job after 
the end of the subsidy period. 
 
There are various sanctions for companies that fail to Saudiize, including exclusion from 
government tenders and loans, a ban on labour card renewals, and the stoppage of 
administrative transactions with the MoL in general. There is even a 1997 GCC-wide 
resolution stipulating a preference for nationalizing companies in their dealings with 
government. Sanctions have been implemented increasingly frequently in recent years, 
but the criteria for doing so are not always clear, given that a large majority of national 
companies are not fulfilling official Saudization quotas. 
 
Implementation issues 
The ambitious targets of quota-based Saudization have often led to situations of legal 
ambiguity in which decrees were clearly not adhered to by business, while the 
government remained unwilling to sanction non-implementation. In many cases, specific 
Saudization demands were withdrawn post hoc, followed by renegotiations of quotas 
and job bans between government and business. Repeated attempts to fully nationalize 
businesses such as the taxi sector, Saudi travel agents, vegetable markets and the gold 
retail trade have had to be abandoned or rescheduled. This has led to great insecurity 
among businesses, undermining their capacity for long-term resource planning, and 
doing significant damage to businesses in the short run in the cases where they were 
subject to sudden crackdowns and sanctions that were then rescinded again. 
 
In fact, business-level Saudization is often negotiable between a company and the 
labour office in charge, and quid pro quos can be found in which e.g. training for Saudi 
employees is accepted as an alternative to an unrealistically high Saudization quota, 
resulting in the release of desired job visas. While such deals might make pragmatic and 
mutually beneficial solutions possible, bureaucratic discretion also reduces the legal 
security of business, and create opportunities for corruption. Labour offices moreover 
have limited information about the actual needs and structures of the hundreds of 
thousands of businesses operating in the kingdom, which can result in misallocation of 
visas and Saudization requirements. 
 
The Ministry of Labour is in charge of inspections to follow up on Saudization 
commitments and to check whether companies have provided correct information about 
their payroll. While the Ministry’s attempts to micro-manage individual companies’ 
employment structures put a high regulatory onus on its bureaucracy, inspection 
capacities have been criticized as insufficient. It remains to be seen whether the recently 
established, MoL-controlled body for labour inspections will significantly increase 
monitoring capabilities. 
 
A recent accord between MoL and the Jeddah Chamber of Commerce (JCCI) delegates 
the assessment of individual companies’ visa and labour needs to a body within JCCI on 
a trial basis. While this body might develop a better “feel” for the employment needs of 
different sectors, it remains unclear whether any central organization is able to asses 
company-level labour needs as well as a price-based, internally liberalized labour market 
could. Even in the best of circumstances, a central clearing house for labour visas will be 
susceptible to manipulation, suffer from insufficient information, and create both 
redundancies and bottlenecks in different parts of the market. 
 
Saudization successes in regional comparison 
Despite administrative pressure and a plethora of Saudization rules, levels of 
Saudization on the private labour market stagnated for many years. It is only since 2006 
that private employment of Saudis seems to have picked up at a measurable pace. 
Some of this is bound to be an outcome of regulatory pressure and sanctions from the 
government. Some of it however is also an outcome of population growth, increasing 
socio-economic pressures on non-employed nationals and increasing cost of living in the 
course of the new oil boom. The Saudization increase in the kingdom remains smaller 
than the increases witnessed in Bahrain and Oman.  
 
Number of Saudi employees in the private sector 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
588,000 598,000 592,000 486,000 623,000 714,000 766,000 829,000 
Source: MoL, SAMA 
 
Although the absolute increase is sizeable, the increase in the rate of Saudization is 
relatively small, because significant numbers of expatriates were imported into the 
kingdom in the same years that more Saudis entered private employment. 
 
Saudization rates in the private sector (2004-2007) 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
10.1% 11.6% 12.8% 13.1% 13.3% 
Source: MoL 
 
The Saudi performance has been lagging relative to its mid-income neighbours Oman 
and Bahrain. While number of private Saudi employees between 2003 and 2008 
increased by about 40%, the corresponding Omani figure is 97%. Despite heavy 
importation of foreign labour, the Omanization ratio remains higher than the Saudization 
ratio. 
 
Number of Omani employees in the private sector 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
74,816 87,064 98,537 114,311 131,775 147,194 
Source: Central Bank of Oman 
  
Omanization rates (2003-2007) 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
15.5% 17.0% 18.8% 18.3% 17.1% 15.6% 
Source: Central Bank of Oman 
 
 
In Bahrain, the increase in Bahraini employees on the private sector between 2003 and 
2008 only amounted to 32% (from 62,000 to 82,000). However, increases in previous 
years – stagnant in Saudi Arabia – were significant, and the overall Bahrainization ratio 
in 2008 reached almost 20%. 
 
 
The price of informal labour markets 
Saudization policies in their current shape have produced some successes, but they 
have arguably also come at a heavy cost. As they are based on company-level 
administrative intervention in the labour markets, they have created numerous labour 
market bottlenecks and incentives for “working around” the rules. 
 
The current national-level regime regulating the Saudi labor market significantly impedes 
the efficient allocation of the foreign workforce, be it expatriates already present in the 
Kingdom or expatriates who are newly recruited from abroad. One can argue that the 
aggregate level of foreign labor in Saudi Arabia would be largely sufficient for the Saudi 
economy: the Ministry of Labor has recently reported that four million new work visas 
have been issued in the last two years alone. However, as long as the right workers are 
not matched with the right employers, the aggregate provision of expatriate labor will 
remain insufficient. The internal mobility of foreign labor in Saudi Arabia is strictly limited, 
which leads to misallocation and bottlenecks on the labor market and, in some cases, 
corruption. 
 
The current sponsorship system ties foreign workers to their current employer and 
cannot change jobs without his/her consent. Workers, however, are not necessarily 
sponsored by the employer who needs them most. Indeed, while some companies have 
a surplus of laborers (and even “hoard” laborers to safeguard future expansion), others 
suffer from labor deficits. Moreover, the workers with the best qualifications for a specific 
job are not always employed by the company who needs this specific expertise the most. 
It is the job of the Ministry of Labor to apportion work visas according to the needs of 
private employers, but it is practically impossible even for the best-run bureaucratic body 
to effectively assess the shifting employment needs of hundreds of thousands of 
companies in an increasingly complex national economy. The result is a misallocation of 
resources and the appearance bottlenecks, which hurt promising companies that lack 
sufficient access to labor and incentivize companies with surplus labor to engage in 
extra-legal practices of reallocating their workforce to other employers (through the “free 
visa” system and other mechanisms of the informal labor market). 
 
Quotas and occupational bans are policies of “micro-management” that demand a 
monitoring capability that is beyond even the most modern of bureaucracies. They 
create incentives for manipulation, “fake employment” and corruption. Rigid Saudization 
ratios moreover are insensitive to the cost caused to individual companies, which can 
imply a very uneven burden on the private sector and can stymie the development of 
particular industries. 
 
Saudi and foreign companies have been very creative at skirting Saudization rules: They 
create sub-companies registered in sectors which demand lower Saudization ratios, 
import workers under false job descriptions – senior Western managers have been 
brought into the country as “camel herders” – buy workers from other companies on an 
informal “free visa” market, put Saudis on the payroll who do not actually do any work 
etc. The uneven allocation of labour and visas through the sponsorship system has 
created a large-scale informal market in which privileged actors with better access to 
visas “resell” workers to employers who actually needs them – either informally or 
through officially transferring sponsorship to them.  
 
All other GCC states have tried to nationalize private labour markets through similar 
mechanisms: global and sectoral quotas, bans on specific professions and temporary 
subsidization of national wages. In all cases, similar methods of shirking rules and 
informal markets for foreign labour have developed, and in all cases, patchy 
implementation, “grace periods” and constant revisions of quotas have created insecurity 
for business. Regulatory capacities and information available to national labour agencies 
have been limited and not up to the very ambitious task of controlling employment 
patterns in every single enterprise. That implementation problems have developed 
among strikingly similar lines in the other Gulf states shows that the underlying causes 
are shared. They are the nature of the sponsorship system and the interventionist 
character of national employment policies. 
 
Kuwaiti as well as UAE companies are known to engage in “ghost employment”, to the 
extent that some Kuwaiti managers spend hours in front of ATMs withdrawing salaries of 
fake Kuwaiti employees, which were temporarily deposited to convince the Ministry of 
Labour of their existence. Qatar and Bahrain until recently have had flourishing “free 
visa” markets and numerous “letterbox companies” whose only purpose is to import 
workers who can then be resold into illegality. Needless to say, free visa employment 
further undermines expatriates’ labour rights, and therefore further tilts the playing field 
against national job-seekers.  
 
The income from the free visa market in Kuwait alone has been estimated at 3 billion $. 
The Saudi figure could be proportionally larger. The deadweight costs for business, the 
extent to which such operations distract from productive activity, and the opportunities 
for administrative corruption are enormous and a heavy burden on economic 
development. It is not clear whether the benefits of Saudization as it is practiced 
currently outweigh the costs. Probably they do not. 
 
 
5 The GCC debate about the sponsorship system and labour pricing 
The limited successes of conventional, top-down, interventionist methods of labour 
market nationalization have led to a lively debate about the nature of labour market 
regulation in general, and about alternative, market-based mechanisms for attaining 
higher national employment quotas. The next section will review these debates and the 
policy steps that have been taken on this basis. The basic idea, most clearly articulated 
by the Bahraini government, is that nationalization cannot be decreed, but it has to be 
induced through market mechanisms, most of all through narrowing the wage gap 
between locals and foreigners, and by allowing foreigners mobility on the local market. 
The idea that a government can let in almost unlimited numbers of low-wage foreign 
workers, but then can prevent them by fiat from competing with locals on the labour 
market, is fallacious – and attempts to prevent competition by enforcing national 
employment will lead most of all to rule avoidance and “fake jobs”, not productive 
employment. 
 
Kuwait 
An additional factor leading to a debate about the sponsorship system has been the 
increasing pressure that international human rights groups and some Western 
governments have put on Gulf countries due to reports of widespread labour abuse. This 
is perhaps the factor that has been most important in the case of Kuwait, where human 
rights groups are well organized and local civil society as well as the national parliament 
have played an important role in the debate. 
 
Occurrences of labour unrest in summer 2008 galvanized the debate about the utility of 
the sponsorship system, and led to an emergency session of the parliament. The 
parliament has formed a “technical labour committee” to discuss the details of 
sponsorship reform. Kuwaiti Minister of Labour Bader Al-Duwaila himself has admitted 
that senior officials in his ministry are involved in the visa trade, and has explicitly 
spoken of “alternatives for the sponsorship system” too meet international rights 
standards.  
 
One of the proposals under discussion is the creation of a private joint stock company 
that would handle the recruitment of foreign labourers. This would replace the current 
situation of individual companies importing labour directly from abroad or through a 
plethora of recruitment agencies. The specialized company would be in charge of 
monitoring the fate of foreign workers who would presumably be mobile between 
different employers, and who would be imported not on the basis of individual company 
requests, but based on a national human resources strategy that would assess the 
aggregate needs of the Kuwaiti economy. 
 
The government is also considering a special state organization to be put in charge of 
labour imports, and is planning to directly import workers for its own contracting and 
construction projects in order to prevent free visa deals. It has already prohibited 
employers from keeping the passports of their employees. 
 
For the time being, however, the debate on sponsorship in Kuwait seems to have moved 
to the backburner, as the new labour law issued in late 2009 did nothing to abolish the 
sponsorship system. Although it increased a number of other formal workers’ rights 
regarding holidays, working hours, severance pay etc., it has done little to close the 
fundamental legal chasm between nationals and expatriates. 
 
Oman 
Oman has been pursuing a dedicated Omanization policy since 1994 under the title of 
“Sanad” (“support”). It set rather high quotas for different sectors of business and 
reserved several job categories for nationals. The implementation of several of the steps 
had to be postponed, however, and during the first few years, Omanization was seen as 
a relative failure. 
 
Omanization has always had a market-based component, however: A 7% levy on 
foreign workers has been used for the training of nationals, similar to the HRDF 
mechanism in Saudi Arabia. The training costs of nationals are subsidized by the 
government, but the subsidies are tied to the condition of subsequently employing the 
individual in question. In the 2008 budget, the training allocation for the private sector 
amounted to 714 million $, a sum that is considerably larger than the budget of the Saudi 
HRDF, despite the much smaller size of the Omani market. 
 
The increased cost of foreign labour due to the training levy has probably contributed to 
the relative successes of Omanization in recent years. While there have been attempts 
to increase the fees levied on foreign labour in Saudi Arabia, these have not been 
systematically implemented. Fees for foreign labour are still low: a work permit costs 100 
SR per year, a residence permit 500 SR per year, to which the government adds a 150 
SR “human resources” fee that accrues to the HRDF. 
 
The most important measure taken by the Omani government in recent years, however, 
has been the relaxation of the “non objection certificate” requirement. Since late 2006, 
expatriates no longer need the permission of their current employer to switch to a new 
one, in effect abolishing the core component of the sponsorship system. This means that 
foreigners can now compete with locals on an even footing, making the latter relatively 
more attractive as employees. This regulatory shift towards a real, integrated labour 
market has also led to an increase in wage levels of expatriates (8.4% in 2008 in the 
case of professionals according to GulfTalent, higher than for any other GCC country), 
which has further decreased the segmentation of the labour market. These two factors 
probably explain a significant part of the impressive Omanization results of 2007 and 
2008, when national employment on the private market increased by 15% and 12% 
respectively.   
 
Case study: Bahrain  
The country which has seen the most comprehensive debate about the sponsorship 
system and about labour market integration is Bahrain. It has also adopted the most 
coherent policy package, based on research by international consultancies. 
 
Originally, “Bahrainization” was also based on quota rules, imposed in 1995: A company 
had to employ 20% nationals during its first year, and 5% during all following years until 
50% were reached. Existing companies also had to follow 5%/year increments until they 
reached 50%. As in other cases, these quotas were usually not reached and created an 
atmosphere of insecurity and backhand dealings. 9000 unemployed Bahrainis were 
reported to make a living off registering fake companies for free visa deals.  
 
With the creation of the Economic Development Board under the Crown Prince, a 
comprehensive policy review was initiated. The basic conclusion of the process was that 
labour market nationalization can only be reached through integrating the labour market, 
i.e. by narrowing the wage gap between locals and foreigners and by giving foreigners 
the same internal mobility on the market. 
 
The official aims of Bahrain’s labour reform as initiated in 2007 are to: 
 
• Deregulate the labour market 
 
• Equalize the cost differential of foreign and local labour 
 
• Give equal rights and choices to foreigners and locals 
 
• Upgrade the working environment standards 
 
• Eliminate Bahranization policy in terms of quotas rules 
 
• Deregulate ‘hire-fire’ procedures 
 
A separate Labour Market Regulatory Authority (LMRA) was created and started its 
operations in 2008 by taking over visa matters and work regulation from the Ministry of 
Labour. All foreign employees had to be re-registered and companies had to “cleanse” 
the data the Ministry of Labour had collected on them. LMRA is building up a larger 
inspection capacity than the MoL had and offers e-government services for both 
employers and workers, who can check their status and data online. A “one-stop-shop” 
has been created to deal with all labour-related bureaucratic transactions. Employers are 
not allowed to hold employees’ passports anymore. 
 
The two core components of the reform however are  
a) that foreign labour is in effect taxed through a biannual and monthly fee, 
increasing its price relative to local labour, and  
b) that foreign employees enjoy increased mobility on the market, being able to 
move to new employers. 
 
Under the new setup, the government charges firms a levy of 200 Bahraini Dinar for a 
two-year work visa, in addition to a 10 Dinar/month fee. Originally, the government had 
planned a much larger fee, but gave in to business protests against a sudden increase in 
labour costs. The idea now is to raise the fees gradually to narrow the wage gap while 
allowing businesses to adjust their organizational structures. Steps towards further 
increases have yet to be taken, however, making the fee’s effect on employment choices 
marginal to date. Bahrainization quotas, which were supposed to be abolished instantly, 
were only reduced and will be maintained for the time being.  
 
As 80% of Bahraini labour levies are used for training purposes, the fees are spent 
locally and their use is expected to contribute to increase the overall productivity of the 
national labour force. Training schemes for Bahrainis are administered through the 
Tamkeen fund (formerly the Labor Fund) and a joint public-private training institute. 
 
The second component of the labour reform is the abolition of the sponsorship system, 
effected through the abrogation of the requirement for a “no objection certificate” from 
employers that allows foreign workers internal mobility on the Bahraini job market. In 
force since summer 2008, its full effects cannot be evaluated yet. As in Oman, however, 
it seems to already have led to wage rises for expatriates above the GCC average, 
increasing the relative competitiveness of national labour. Bahrain was the only GCC 
country in which professional wages rose above inflation in 2008. 
 
The Bahraini reforms were preceded by wide-ranging public debate about the policy 
proposals; draft regulations are usually posted on the LMRA website for public comment. 
This way, the reform could be introduced in a reasonably smooth manner, and apart 
from the reduction of the planned labour fees, the Bahraini government avoided the 
sudden reversals and short-term modifications usually so typical of GCC labour policy.  
 
The Bahraini government is also pursuing deliberate policies to prevent the emergence 
of a stratum of “working poor” among its nationals – a distinct danger in case 
nationalization policies are promoted without controlling the aggregate supply and 
increasing the price of foreign labour. The average income of Bahrainis in the private 
sector lies significantly above that of Omanis and has increased considerably in the last 
three years – narrowing the gap with public sector wages from 284 to 239 Dinar despite 
several raises in the civil service. Preliminary data for 2009 show that the gap has further 
narrowed below 200 Dinar. The Bahraini government is encouraging companies to 
guarantee a minimum wage for Bahraini nationals, in some cases subsidizing the 
increased salaries for up to six months. 
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The Bahraini government has also introduced a 1% income tax for a national 
unemployment insurance, from which unemployed university graduates are paid a 
stipend between 120 and 150 BD in return for attending training courses. Nationals who 
lose their job after paying contributions for a minimum period of 12 months are eligible to 
receive 60% of their salary every month, with a maximum payment of 500 BD and a 
minimum of 150 BD. 
 
The Bahraini government is clearly concerned not only with increasing the participation 
rate of nationals on the private job market, but also with creating jobs that pay them a 
living wage. The trends in Oman and Saudi Arabia, by contrast, seem to have been to 
increase national employment, but at the cost of decreased wages. 
 Bahrain seems to be the most successful case of combining acceptable incomes with 
acceptable employment levels in the Gulf. The current official unemployment rate in 
Bahrain is 4%. This only includes individuals officially registered as unemployed and 
hence might be of limited utility. What is more significant is that the employment rate of 
Bahrainis in working age is above 40%: below OECD averages, but significantly above 
the figures we estimated for Saudi Arabia above. Moreover, most of this employment is 
provided by the private sector, not the government. 
 
The Saudi debate on sponsorship 
Saudi Arabia has also seen a lively debate about the sponsorship system in 2007 and 
2008, but is less advanced than Bahrain and Oman in reforming it. In early 2008, Mifleh 
Al-Qahtani, deputy president of the National Human Rights Society (NHRS), explained 
that he expected the current sponsorship system to be abolished within three years. 
Discussions between Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Labour, the state-run Human Rights 
Committee and the National Human Rights Society on the issue appear to be fairly 
advanced, but public participation in the debate has been limited. 
 
Two major proposals have been floated about the issue: One is from the Ministry of 
Labour, which plans to license several private recruitment companies to take over the 
sponsorship of expatriate workers. The second one is from the Human Rights Society, 
which prefers the establishment of a dedicated state organization to be in charge of 
labour imports and to work as “state sponsor” of foreign labour. Both proposals seem to 
be based on the conclusion that a real, integrated labour market needs to be created.  
 
Creating such a market would imply granting foreign workers full internal labor market 
mobility, allowing them to find the employers who need them most. Ideally, a simple 
price mechanism would determine labor allocation, and hence employment would be 
structured according to the actual demand (and the actual readiness to pay) of 
employers. Once a pool of specialized expatriate personnel is created in Saudi Arabia, 
the labor market, and not the bureaucracy, should allocate them. This will greatly help to 
accommodate sectoral change and the development of new industries in particular.  
 
Current quota- and prohibition-based mechanisms of Saudization constitute attempts of 
“micro-management” that demand a monitoring capability that is beyond even the most 
modern of bureaucracies. They create incentives for manipulation, “fake employment” 
and corruption. Rigid Saudization ratios moreover are insensitive to the cost caused to 
individual companies, which can imply a very uneven burden on the private sector and 
can stymie the development of particular industries. 
 
The only realistic way of accomplishing Saudization without choking business growth 
and imposing huge deadweight losses, is through a market mechanism of some kind 
that will allow companies to adjust to Saudization according to their individual needs and 
capabilities, while also allowing an increase of the aggregate Saudization level. 
 
There would be two conceivable ways of achieving this:  
 
• By limiting the aggregate supply of foreign labor, thereby gradually increasing its 
price, making Saudi employment more attractive 
• By levying a fee on the employment of foreign labor, again shifting relative prices 
and leading to higher Saudi employment 
 One of the two will have to happen for Saudis to become more competitive employees. 
As long as there is an aggregate surplus expatriate labor, no amount of micro-
intervention can prevent a de facto wage differential and a de facto preference for 
foreign workers. Regulations will be ignored or circumvented and informal labor markets 
be created, counteracting the intention of the sponsorship system that was supposed to 
increase control over foreign labor issues. No country, including the most developed 
OECD countries, could guarantee gainful employment for its national population as long 
as the gates of mass migration for cheap labour are open to the extent that they are in 
the GCC.  
 
In principle, both of the tools proposed by MoL and NHRS could be used for such 
aggregate labour supply and pricing mechanisms, which require much less 
administrative intervention, put a lesser burden on the labour bureaucracy’s monitoring 
capacities, create much smaller total cost for government and business, and much less 
opportunity for corruption than the current decree-based Saudization policies.  
 
6 Outlook: sectoral and macro-economic dimensions of labour nationalization  
In Saudi Arabia as elsewhere in the GCC, labour nationalization has its biggest potential 
in mid-skills, mid-wage sectors, where enough jobs can be generated to make a 
difference to aggregate national employment, nationals are most likely to be competitive 
on skills, and the expatriate-local wage gap is the narrowest. The nationalization of low-
wage sectors at current salary rates is neither economically nor politically desirable, and 
not feasible with current national reservation wages. High-income sectors are attractive 
to nationals, but they will never produce a large amount of jobs, and the current supply 
of highly qualified nationals is limited. Moreover, in a globalized economy, countries’ 
competitiveness increasingly depends on the import of small numbers of highly skilled 
international workers.  
 
Mid-income occupations, including clerical/administrative workers, technical specialists, 
technicians, and sales workers, should hence also be the main target of national training 
efforts. In the Saudi case, national wages in such occupations are only 1.2 to 2 times as 
high as those of foreigners (compared to an almost tenfold gap in low-wage agriculture 
for example). Given the higher non-wage costs of foreigners, a labour policy that would 
increase foreign wages to the level of national wages here would impose only moderate 
costs on business, but could have significant local employment effects if combined with 
general labour market liberalization. Currently, mid-skills Saudi workers seem to be 
particularly underemployed (Girgis), indicating a particularly large potential for increasing 
national labour market participation. 
 
At the same time, these sectors could provide wages above 3000 SR/month. Judging by 
informal interviews conducted for this study, this seems to be the average reservation 
wage of young Saudis with secondary education, and also seems to be the bare 
minimum that would be acceptable from a standpoint of social stability and equity. Note 
that expatriate wages in construction and other low-wage services are very significantly 
below this threshold. 
Saudis vs. expatriate monthly wages, 2007 (SR) 
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The macro-economic impact of higher labour costs 
A full estimate of the macro-economic impact of higher labour costs in the GCC is 
beyond the remit of this paper (see the JISR paper by Eberhard Fees on this topic). Yet, 
a few basic observations can be made. 
 
First, it is clear that competitiveness of GCC companies would be affected by higher 
average wages, even if these are market-determined and phased in gradually. However, 
the impact on tradables sectors will be different from that on non-tradables. Non-
tradables – service sectors such as commerce, finance, restaurants etc. – are less 
exposed to international competition and therefore could hand on somewhat higher 
production prices to the consumer. However, as higher prices would be caused by 
higher wage payments to nationals, which moreover would partially substitute for 
foreigners, the aggregate direct income effect for nationals would be positive. Moreover, 
past sectoral successes, such as the Saudization of supermarket cashiers, have had a 
negligible impact on price levels. 
  
In tradable sectors, i.e. those producing exportable goods, the impact of higher wages 
on competitiveness would depend on the labour intensity of businesses. In heavier 
industries, higher wages will have a negligible impact. In more labour-intensive 
downstream manufacturing, higher wages need to be combined with a stronger focus on 
specialized technical training with a view to increasing labour productivity of national 
employees. In many sectors there is considerable scope for technological upgrading of 
production, and as above productivity statistics have shown, the availability of very 
cheap labour might in fact have stymied efforts at increasing productivity. To some 
extent, therefore, higher wage levels will by themselves induce a quest for higher 
productivity. Beyond this, a reform of technical training with heavier involvement of 
private sector players is probably needed, which however is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
 
Generally speaking, market-based nationalization will lead to fewer nationals replacing 
more expatriates. The assumption of one-to-one substitution on which some of the past 
labour market plans have been based are unrealistic, as they include numerous low-
wage jobs that will (and should) disappear in the course of nationalization. Expected 
national-expatriate substitution ratios for Gulf countries have been estimated at 30%. 
 
This means that wages up to three times as high can be paid presuming that the labour 
of higher will be utilized more productively. This will be a challenge in many sectors, but 
is far from impossible, given the very low existing rates of labour productivity. The 
government and its sectoral agencies could play a role by promoting model projects 
together with chambers of commerce that demonstrate the use of higher value-added 
national labour. 
 
Needless to say, a reduced number of expatriate workers would stanch the drain of 
remittances from GCC economies and reduce the infrastructure and public service costs 
created by foreigners outlined above. Moreover, locally spent wage income would have 
a significant multiplier effect in the national economy. 
 
At this point, the economic and regulatory requirements of well-implemented labour 
nationalization are clear to many GCC technocrats, but the political will from the highest 
leadership in most case is still lacking. Moreover, even forward-looking Bahrain has 
failed to find a strategy to “package” internal labour market liberalization and increased 
foreign labour costs in a way to make it acceptable to business. Finding a political quid 
pro quo that will bring business on board for meaningful labour market reform is arguably 
the primary economic policy challenge that GCC regimes will face in the coming 
decades. 
 
 
 
